Divided we stand, united we worry: Predictors of worry in anticipation of a political election by Rankin, Kyla & Sweeny, Kate
UC Riverside
UC Riverside Previously Published Works
Title
Divided we stand, united we worry: Predictors of worry in anticipation of a political election
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9988p8q5
Journal
Motivation and Emotion, 43(6)
ISSN
0146-7239
Authors
Rankin, Kyla
Sweeny, Kate
Publication Date
2019-12-01
DOI
10.1007/s11031-019-09787-5
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Running Head: DIVIDED WE STAND  2 
 
Abstract 
Across two studies, we examined predictors of voters’ worry about the outcome of a political 
election, thus testing the application of the uncertainty navigation model to political waiting 
periods. Using a theoretically-grounded set of predictors, we assessed voters who preferred either 
the Democrats and Republicans to control the House of Representatives following the 2018 U.S. 
midterm election (N = 376) and Trump and Clinton voters leading up to the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election (N = 669). Findings generally supported the predictions of the model, such 
that people worried more as Election Day approached, as did people who saw the election 
outcome as more important, who believed it was more likely their preferred candidate would lose 
(Study 2), and who had a set of worry-exacerbating traits. Taken together, the findings provide 
considerable insight into the dynamics of worry during stressful waiting periods and support the 
generalizability of the uncertainty navigation model to political contexts. 
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Over 135 million people voted in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (United States 
Election Project, 2016). Prior to and on Election Day, Americans were divided by both political 
ideology and their preferred election outcome. However, all Americans shared one thing in 
common: They had to wait to learn who would become their 45th president. Two years later, 
Americans were again deeply divided as the 2018 U.S. midterm elections approached and faced 
significant uncertainty about which political party would have power in Congress after Election 
Day. Although the experience of waiting varies across domains, circumstances, and individuals, 
people typically find waiting to be worrisome (Sweeny & Falkenstein, 2015; Sweeny & 
Andrews, 2014). Across two studies we examine predictors of worry, as outlined by the 
uncertainty navigation model (Sweeny & Cavanaugh, 2012), in anticipation of these two political 
outcomes. Specifically, we surveyed American voters prior to the 2016 presidential election and 
the 2018 midterm election as they endured uncertainty over whom would be the next president-
elect and which party would have control of the U.S. House of Representatives following the 
election, respectively. 
Understanding Worry  
Worry, defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10), is a key antecedent of 
many protective and productive behaviors. For example, people who worry more about the 
relevant outcome are more likely to engage in cancer screening (Hay, McCaul & Magnan, 2006) 
and other preventive health behaviors (sun protection, Bränström et al., 2010; seatbelt use, 
Sutton & Eiser, 1990; safe sex practices, van der Plight, Otten, Richard, & van der Velde, 1993; 
vaccination, Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington, 2004; Cuite et al., 2000) and tend to show 
better job performance (Perkins, & Corr, 2005) and academic performance (Siddique et al., 
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2006). Similarly, during acute moments of uncertainty, worry seems to motivate the use of 
coping strategies that prepare people for worst-case scenarios—and if they ultimately receive bad 
news, people who worried more while they waited are better prepared to absorb the blow and 
move forward (Sweeny et al., 2016).  
Of course, worry is also quite unpleasant and can be disruptive to daily life. In non-
clinical populations, worry has been linked to depressed mood and heightened anxiety (Behar, 
Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). When worry arises in the 
context of generalized anxiety disorder, it often arises in concert with fatigue, reduced 
concentration, irritability, and sleep disruptions, among other problematic symptoms (e.g., Llera 
& Newman, 2014; Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013).   
Given the critical role that worry can play as both a motivating force and an impairment 
to well-being, a better understanding of protective and risk factors with regard to worry is 
important for targeting effective interventions, either to reduce worry or to direct worry toward 
productive ends. The uncertainty navigation model (Sweeny & Cavanaugh, 2012) provides a 
theoretical lens through which to view various types of uncertain waiting periods, including 
predictors of worry during these periods. Although originally developed as a theoretical 
approach to understanding the experience of awaiting health news, it has been extended to non-
health contexts (e.g., waiting for bar exam results; Sweeny & Andrews, 2014; Sweeny et al., 
2016; Howell & Sweeny, 2016). At its heart lies the distinct experience of distress prompted by 
acute moments of uncertainty, namely a combination of anxiety and repetitive thoughts that later 
iterations of the model have simply referred to as worry.1 The model also includes a set of 
                                                          
1 To be clear, the uncertainty navigation model is not a model of worry’s nature or function. Instead, it was 
developed to provide a framework for understanding how people feel and cope when they are waiting for important 
news. Worry is an inevitable part of that experience, and thus the model makes some predictions about the 
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characteristics of both the situation and the person facing it that may elevate or mitigate worry 
during a waiting period. However, this list was not intended to be comprehensive, and it has yet 
to undergo empirical scrutiny. The goal of the current study is to provide a test of the predictors 
of worry outlined in the uncertainty navigation model in a context in which the outcome had 
implications for a large number of people and over which people had little control—namely, the 
outcome of a political election.  
Predictors of Worry 
We should note that a large literature addresses worry in the context of anxiety disorders, 
most notably generalized anxiety disorder (Newman et al., 2013). Here, we focus on worry in the 
context of non-clinical populations facing worrisome uncertainty in their lives. In that context, 
the uncertainty navigation model identifies five predictors of worry during stressful waiting 
periods: proximity to the news, severity of potential bad news, risk of receiving bad news, 
controllability of the news or its consequences, and individual differences in future outlooks, 
comfort with uncertainty, and psychological resources. We test these predictors in the current 
study, as well as several additional predictors that were not included in the initial iteration of the 
uncertainty navigation model but have particular relevance during a societal-level moment of 
uncertainty (versus more personal experiences like awaiting the result of one’s medical test or 
exam result).  
Although the uncertainty navigation model does not articulate why this set of situational 
and personal factors would exacerbate worry, consideration of two key components of a 
worrisome experience reveals the systematic nature of these predictors. First, by its very nature, 
worry is a response to aversive uncertainty about potential future problems. Thus, characteristics 
                                                          
circumstances under which worry is most likely to arise (within the broader context of uncertain waiting periods). It 
is these predictions we test in the present paper.  
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of the situation or person that heighten this stressful sense of uncertainty are likely to exacerbate 
worry. Second, worry has a motivating function, such that it directs attention and effort toward 
opportunities to prevent future problems if possible (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; for a review, 
see Sweeny & Dooley, 2017). However, this motivational drive can only be satisfied if people 
have control over the relevant future outcome; otherwise, worry’s function is thwarted. Thus, 
characteristics of the situation or person that increase one’s degree of control over the future 
(whether actual or perceived) are likely to mitigate worry by conferring a sense that worry has 
done its job and can recede into the background. We specify the links between this framework 
for understanding worry and each hypothesized predictor below.   
 Severity of potential bad news. The uncertainty navigation model suggests that the 
severity of anticipated bad news can influence the extent to which people worry about that 
outcome while they wait, presumably because feelings of uncertainty are more stressful to the 
extent that the potential future problem is more problematic. In fact, several studies have 
confirmed the link between the severity of a feared negative outcome and negatively-valanced 
thoughts and emotions, including worry (Chapman & Coups, 2006; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998; 
Tull et al., 2011). In the current study, we operationalize severity as voters’ perception of the 
importance of the election outcome and the degree to which people believed the United States 
would change (for better or worse) as a result of the opposing major party candidate being 
elected. We hypothesized that voters who perceived the election outcome to be more important 
(Hypothesis 1a; Studies 1 and 2) and who felt that the United States would change for the worse 
if the opposing candidate was elected would report greater worry prior to the election 
(Hypothesis 1b; Study 2). 
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Risk of receiving bad news. A third predictor of worry proposed by the uncertainty 
navigation model is the risk of receiving bad news, as perceived by the worrier. Research in the 
context of health outcomes provides strong evidence for a link between risk perceptions and 
worry (e.g., in the context of cancer risk; Bjorvatn et al., 2007; DiLorenzo et al., 2006; Gibbons 
& Groarke, 2016), such that people who perceive themselves to be at greater risk for an 
undesirable outcome tend to worry more about that outcome. In fact, uncertainty can be 
pleasurable when the array of potential future outcomes are all relatively positive (Wilson, 
Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005). Thus, consistent with the framework proposed earlier, a 
perception that one is at risk of a future problem elicits stressful uncertainty, and consequently 
worry. In the current study, we operationalized risk perceptions as voters’ perception of the 
likelihood that their preferred candidate would lose the election (i.e., a bad outcome). We 
hypothesized that voters who perceived the risk of a bad outcome to be greater would be more 
worried in anticipation of Election Day (Hypothesis 2; Studies 1 and 2). 
Control over the outcome. The final predictor of worry proposed by the uncertainty 
navigation model, and further articulated in the framework above, is the degree to which an 
undesirable outcome is preventable—that is, the extent to which people feel that they have 
control over their outcome. Studies have identified a negative relationship between control and 
worry in the context of academic pursuits (Putwain, Woods & Symes, 2010) and medical tests 
(Dawson, Savitsky, & Dunning, 2006), and other work has linked general perceptions of control 
to lower overall worry (Chapman, Kertz, & Woodruff-Borden, 2009; Zebb & Beck, 1998). In 
contrast, and most relevant to the current investigation, greater political engagement (one marker 
of perceived control over political outcomes) was associated with greater politically-relevant 
worry in a study of attitudes and engagement with issues relevant to the European Union 
DIVIDED WE STAND  8 
 
(Strohmeier et al., 2017). However, in that study, the authors interpreted the relationship as 
suggesting that more worried participants were more motivated toward engagement, rather than 
the other way around (i.e., engagement predicting worry). Given the mixed evidence, we used 
our framework as a guide and tentatively hypothesized that people who felt that they had more 
control over the outcome of the presidential election would report less worry. We operationalized 
perceived control as a combination of active political engagement (e.g., campaigning for one’s 
preferred candidate; Hypothesis 3a; Study 1 and Study 2) and voters’ perception that their vote 
had an impact on the outcome of the election (Hypothesis 3b; Study 2).   
Individual differences. In previous studies that have examined the experience of awaiting 
uncertain news (albeit in performance contexts rather than political ones), both dispositional 
optimism (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010) and defensive pessimism (e.g., Norem, 
2001) have emerged as consistent predictors of various aspects of the waiting experience. People 
high in dispositional optimism and low in defensive pessimism consistently experience less 
anxiety and fewer repetitive thoughts (i.e., worry less) while they wait (Sweeny & Andrews, 
2014; Sweeny et al., 2015). These trait-like individual differences serve to heighten (in the case 
of defensive pessimism) or minimize (in the case of dispositional optimism) people’s perception 
that they are at risk of facing an unpleasant future.   
Another robust and reliable predictor of people’s experiences as they await uncertain 
news is the extent to which they are generally comfortable with various types of uncertainty—a 
trait-like individual difference referred to in the clinical literature as intolerance of uncertainty 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002). People who are dispositionally intolerant of uncertainty tend to worry 
excessively (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003) and 
find it difficult to manage their anxiety during stressful situations (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; 
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Sweeny & Andrews, 2014; Sweeny et al., 2015). In fact, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model 
(IUM; Dugas et al., 1998) proposes four factors that exacerbate and maintain worry (particularly 
among sufferers of GAD), one of which is intolerance of uncertainty. The IUM differs from the 
uncertainty navigation model in its focus on individual vulnerabilities to worry (namely 
intolerance of uncertainty, positive beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and 
cognitive avoidance) rather than focusing broadly on situational and individual factors that 
exacerbate worry during the specific experience of awaiting uncertain news. Nonetheless, the 
predictions of the IUM with respect to intolerance of uncertainty overlaps with one of the 
predictions of the uncertainty navigation model.    
One aim of the current study was to replicate the links between these individual 
differences and worry in a novel context, and thus we hypothesized that people who are high in 
dispositional optimism, low in defensive pessimism, and low in intolerance of uncertainty would 
worry less in anticipation of Election Day (Hypotheses 4a-4c; Studies 1 and 2).    
Proximity to news. A consistent finding in the small but growing literature on the 
experience of awaiting uncertain news is that waiting is dynamic, with the experience changing 
across a waiting period. Moreover, the pattern of change seems to be predictable, such that 
waiting is hardest when uncertainty is most salient (typically at the beginning and at the end of a 
waiting period; e.g., Howell & Sweeny, 2016; Sweeny & Andrews, 2014; Sweeny & Howell, 
2017; Sweeny et al., 2016), consistent with the framework just proposed. Because the wait for 
election results does not have a clear start, particularly given the ever-lengthier campaign 
“season” in the U.S., we focus here on shifts that occur as Election Day draws near. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that worry would increase over time, peaking just prior to Election Day 
(Hypothesis 5; Study 2).  
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 Extending the uncertainty navigation model. The context of the current study provided 
a unique opportunity to extend the application of the uncertainty navigation model to societal-
level moments of uncertainty and thus explore additional predictors of worry. First, we examined 
the role of social context—namely, the degree to which people’s social groups concurred with 
their preferred outcome. In previously-studied waiting periods like the wait for bar exam or 
medical test results, all members of one’s social group are presumably rooting for the same 
outcome. In contrast, an election creates “teams” that are rooting for mutually exclusive 
outcomes. Some people are surrounded by others on their team, whereas other people are 
isolated within groups of opposing team members. In Study 2, we explored the role of this type 
of social context in worry about the election outcome. 
 Second, we examined the role of media exposure in waiting experiences. Similar to 
social context, some people primarily consume media that is consistent with their preferred 
outcome (i.e., consistent with their political leaning), whereas other people consume media from 
a variety of sources, or even from sources that contradict their preferences. We explored the role 
of media consumption in worry about the election outcome in Study 2. 
Study 1 
Study 1 examined the predictors of worry in anticipation of the 2018 U.S. midterm 
election.2  
Method 
 Participants. Amazon mTurk workers (N = 376; 193 preferred that the Republicans 
remain control of the U.S. House of Representatives after the 2018 midterm election, 183 
                                                          
2 Although this study was run after Study 2, which examined these processes in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
we present the studies in this order in the interest of the flow of the manuscript, such that Study 1 is followed by a 
larger and more complex Study 2 that included additional predictors. 
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preferred that the Democrats gain control of the U.S. House of Representatives after the 2018 
midterm election; Mage = 38.34; 45% female) were compensated US$1 for completing a pre-
election survey. In order to participate in the study, mTurk workers had to be over the age of 18 
and a United States citizen, the same requirements to vote in U.S. elections. Participants also had 
to intend on voting in the election and have a preferred outcome (i.e., Republicans remain in 
control or that Democrats gain control of the U.S. House of Representatives following the 2018 
U.S. midterm elections). Participants also had the opportunity to complete a post-election survey 
for an additional US$2 (n = 176); this survey is irrelevant to the current paper. All materials are 
available as Supplemental Materials online and on the Open Science Framework at 
https://osf.io/kt6x7/, and deidentified data will be posted there within one year. This study was 
reviewed and approved by the authors’ Institutional Review Board.  
 Procedure. Participants were recruited two days prior to the 2018 midterm election. 
Following informed consent, participants completed an online survey. At the end of the survey, 
participants had the option to provide their email address to receive a follow-up survey one day 
after the election. A total of 307 participants provided their email address, and 57.3% of these 
participants completed the second survey. For the purpose of the current paper, we focus on pre-
election data.   
 Measures.  
Worry. Worry about the outcome of the midterm election was assessed with three items, 
capturing both the affective and cognitive components of worry (Sweeny & Dooley, 2017; “I 
feel anxious every time I think about the outcome of the midterm elections,” “I am worried about 
the outcome of the midterm elections,” “I can’t seem to stop thinking about the outcome of the 
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midterm elections”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 3.86, SD = 1.50, Cronbach’s 
α = .87). 
 Individual differences. Dispositional optimism was assessed with the Life Orientation 
Test-Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994; e.g., “In uncertain times, I usually expect the 
best,” “I hardly ever expect things to go my way”; 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 
3.45, SD = .95, α = .89). 
 Defensive pessimism was assessed with the validated 5-item Defensive Pessimism 
Questionnaire, Short Form (Norem, Butler, & Prayson, 2015; 5 items; e.g., “I usually prepare for 
the worst,” “I often think about what might go wrong”; 1 = not true at all of me, 7 = very true of 
me; M = 4.93, SD = 1.11; α = .80). 
 We assessed intolerance of uncertainty using the 12-item Intolerance of Uncertainty–
Short scale (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; e.g., “Unforeseen events upset me greatly,” 
“I always want to know what the future has in store for me”; 1 = not at all characteristic of me, 5 
= extremely characteristic of me; M = 3.07, SD = .77; α = .90). 
We also assessed participants’ political orientation (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely 
conservative; M = 3.93, SD = 1.92) for use as a covariate in relevant analyses.  
Perceived severity. Importance of the election outcome was assessed with three items 
(“The outcome of the U.S. midterm elections will affect how I live my life,” “I care about the 
outcome of the U.S. midterm elections ,” “It is very important to me who wins the U.S. midterm 
elections”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.63, SD = 1.05; α = .76).  
 Perceived risk. We assessed participants’ perception of the risk of a bad outcome (i.e., 
their non-preferred party winning) with a single item (“Which party do you think will have 
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control of the U.S. House of Representatives after the 2018 midterm elections?”; 1 = definitely 
my preferred party, 7 = definitely my non-preferred party; M = 2.69, SD = 1.31). 
 Perceived control. Perceived control was assessed by measuring political engagement. 
Participants indicated the extent to which they had engaged in six politically-active behaviors 
(e.g., “I have attended political rallies,” “I try to persuade others to share my views”; 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 3.77, SD = 1.34, α = .88).  
Results 
 Table 1 presents a correlation matrix including all variables of interest.   
 Severity of potential bad news. For our remaining analyses, we examined predictors of 
worry prior to the midterm election using multiple regression analyses predicting worry from 
each predictor (separately), while controlling for outcome preference (Republican = -0.5, 
Democrat = 0.5) and their interaction.3 Table 2 presents independent-samples t-tests comparing 
supporters on all relevant variables, and full results of the regression analyses are presented in 
Table 3. All findings are consistent when controlling for political orientation instead of outcome 
preference.  
 As hypothesized, participants who perceived the election outcome as more important 
reported greater worry about the outcome (Hypotheses 1a). 
 Risk of receiving bad news. Contrary to our hypothesis, risk of a bad outcome (i.e., that 
participants’ preferred party would not have control of the U.S. House of Representatives 
following the election) was unrelated to worry about the outcome of the election (Hypothesis 2). 
 Control over the outcome. In contrast to our tentative hypothesis, participants who were 
more politically engaged worried more about the outcome of the election (Hypotheses 3a). 
                                                          
3 For this analysis and all other multiple regression analyses in this paper, all variables were entered in the same step 
using the enter method. 
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 Individual differences. As hypothesized, participants lower in dispositional optimism 
and higher in defensive pessimism and intolerance of uncertainty reported greater worry 
(Hypotheses 4a-4c).   
 All together now. Lastly, we conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting worry 
from all predictors of interest, controlling for outcome preference, to identify the strongest 
independent relationships with worry.4 Results from this analysis appear in Table 3. In order of 
the magnitude of each effect, findings suggest that participants who were higher in intolerance of 
uncertainty more politically engaged, perceived the election to be more important, and were 
lower in dispositional optimism experienced significantly greater worry. Thus, all predictors that 
were statistically significant in the individual regression analyses remained significant in the 
simultaneous regression model, with the exception of defensive pessimism. Furthermore, the 
standardized estimates for all of the predictors except defensive pessimism were within the 95% 
confidence intervals of the standardized estimates within the individual regression models. 
Study 2 
Consistent with our hypotheses, Study 1 found that voters who placed greater importance 
on the election and who usually find waiting to be difficult worried more about the outcome of 
the 2018 U.S. midterm election. In contrast, perceived risk was unrelated to worry about the 
election outcome and political engagement was positively related to worry about the election 
outcome. In Study 2 we seek to replicate and extend these results in the context of the 2018 U.S. 
presidential election. A presidential election, compared to a midterm election, focuses the entire 
nation on one election outcome and tends to be more important in the eyes of voters.  
                                                          
4 No two predictor variables were correlated greater than r = |.49|, thus providing reassurance against 
multicollinearity concerns. We also inspected the residual plots for all multiple regression analyses and saw no cause 
for concern regarding non-normality or non-linear associations. Results were nearly identical when corrected for 
potential heteroscedasticity. 
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In addition to measuring each construct as we did in Study 1, we have also included 
supplemental measures of severity of and control over the outcome. We also included time as a 
predictor via a cross-sectional panel design. As discussed earlier, proximity of news reliably 
predicts increases in worry in previous work. Although the political climate during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election was unique in a variety of ways, which may have affected temporal 
fluctuations in worry, we anticipated that worry would increase linearly as news approached as 
in previous studies (Hypothesis 5). Finally, in Study 2 we extended the uncertainty navigation 
model to explore the role of social context and media consumption in worry about an election 
outcome. 
Method  
 Participants. Amazon mTurk workers (N = 669; 330 Donald Trump supporters, 339 
Hillary Clinton supporters; Mage = 34.6; 44% female) were compensated US$1 for completing a 
pre-election survey. In order to participate in the study, mTurk workers had to be over the age of 
18 and a United States citizen. Participants also had the opportunity to complete an additional 
post-election survey for an additional US$2 (n = 476), but measures in the post-election survey 
are not discussed here. 
Although we recruited 800 participants in our initial efforts (a new batch of 50 Clinton 
supporters and Trump supporters each week over the seven weeks leading up to the election), we 
removed 131 pre-election survey responses because these participants completed the survey 
more than once across weeks5 or reported in the post-election survey that they voted for the 
opposing major party candidate than they initially indicated supporting in the pre-election survey 
                                                          
5 The possibility of repeat participation was due to a combination of an error on our part in neglecting to prevent 
repeat responses within the survey and the fact that we had to post several “batches” (essentially, versions of the 
study) on mTurk.  
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(i.e., completing the pre-election survey as a Trump supporter then voting for Clinton or vice 
versa; n = 79). We strongly suspect that those who switched their apparent support between the 
two major party candidates were dishonest in one survey or the other or were unsure of who they 
would vote for until Election Day had arrived. After these 131 participants were deleted from the 
dataset, 669 participants remained in the pre-election survey, as indicated above. In the post-
election survey, 56 people either reported that they had voted for a third-party candidate (n = 27) 
or chose to not specify (n = 29); we conservatively retained these participants in our analyses. 
For all analyses that compare Trump and Clinton supporters, we identify participants by the 
candidate for whom they indicated support in the pre-election survey.    
 We aimed for a sample that would provide ample power for analyses of change over time 
(n = 100 at each measurement point). All materials are available as Supplemental Materials 
online and on the Open Science Framework at osf.io/7j3ca, and full data are available upon 
request. This study was reviewed and approved by the authors’ Institutional Review Board.  
 Procedure. Participants were recruited each week over the seven weeks leading up to the 
2016 presidential election using a cross-sectional panel design.6 That is, each participant 
completed one survey before Election Day, spread across seven weeks. The eighth and final pre-
election survey was completed one day before the election. Following informed consent 
procedures, participants completed an online survey. At the end of the survey, participants had 
the option to provide their email address if they wished to complete a follow-up survey one day 
after the election. A total of 645 participants provided their email address, and 73.8% of these 
                                                          
6 We tested the possibility that participants may have differed in notable ways across weeks. We ran one-way 
ANOVAs (continuous variables) and chi-square tests (categorical variables) comparing the eight time-based groups 
on demographic variables, religiosity, political orientation, and candidate preference. Only education and religiosity 
differed across groups. Importantly, neither education nor religiosity was notably correlated with worry, rs < .07, ps 
> .08. 
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participants ultimately completed the second survey. As in Study 1, we focus on pre-election 
data.  
 Measures. Unless otherwise noted, all measures were identical to those in Study 1, 
reworded to be applicable to the presidential election instead of the midterm election. 
 Worry. Worry about the outcome of the presidential election was assessed with three 
items (M = 4.21, SD = 1.55, α = .86). 
 Individual differences. Dispositional optimism was assessed with the Life Orientation 
Test-Revised (9 items rather than 10 due to a survey error; M = 3.40, SD = 1.00, α = .88).7 
Defensive pessimism was assessed with the 5-item Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire, Short 
Form (M = 4.95, SD = 1.16; α = .82). Intolerance of uncertainty was assessed using the 12-item 
Intolerance of Uncertainty–Short scale (M = 2.99, SD = .81; α = .90). We again assessed 
participants’ political orientation (M = 2.82, SD = 1.19) for use as a covariate in relevant 
analyses.  
Perceived severity. Importance of the election outcome was again assessed with three 
items (M = 5.46, SD = 1.26; α = .84). As an additional measure of perceived severity, 
participants also reported the extent to which the United States would change as a result of their 
non-preferred candidate being elected (1 = much worse; 7 = much better; M = 3.67, SD = 1.69).  
 Perceived risk. We assessed participants’ perception of the risk of a bad outcome (i.e., 
their non-preferred candidate winning) with a single item from 0% to 100% (M = 35.80%, SD = 
20.72). 
                                                          
7 Although we cannot be certain whether the validated properties of the LOT-R were retained with the missing item, 
a comparison between the results of Studies 1 and 2 provides reassurance that the measure worked in substantively 
the same way across studies. 
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 Perceived control. Perceived control was assessed in two ways. First, as in Study 1, 
participants indicated the extent to which they had engaged in six politically-active behaviors (M 
= 3.56, SD = 1.28, α = .84). Second, participants reported the extent to which they felt that their 
vote had an impact on the outcome of the presidential election (“Do you feel that your vote will 
have a significant impact on the outcome of the presidential election?”; 1 = definitely not, 5 = 
definitely yes; M = 2.74, SD = 1.17).  
Social context. Participants reported the percentage of their social group that supported 
their preferred candidate (indicating from 0% to 100% in increments of 10% for each of the 
following groups: friends, family, coworkers, acquaintances; overall M = 5.31, equivalent to 
53.1%), SD = 2.46, equivalent to 24.6%).  
Media exposure. We assessed the news sources participants used to acquire information 
regarding the election (12 total; e.g., nightly network news, cables news, news websites). We 
examined both the total number of news sources participants reported using (M = 3.12, SD = 
1.65), as well as the average political leaning of the news sources they accessed (1 = right-
leaning; 5 = left-leaning; M = 3.93, SD = 1.01). Political leaning scores for each news source 
were drawn from a media-fact-checking website (https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/).  
Results 
 Table 4 presents a correlation matrix including all variables of interest.   
 Severity of potential bad news. For our remaining analyses, we examined predictors of 
worry prior to the presidential election using multiple regression analyses predicting worry from 
each predictor (separately), while controlling for candidate preference (Trump = -0.5, Clinton = 
0.5) and their interaction. Table 5 presents independent-samples t-tests comparing Trump and 
Clinton supporters on all relevant variables, and full results of the regression analyses are 
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presented in Table 6. Unless otherwise noted, all findings are consistent when controlling for 
political orientation instead of candidate preference.  
 As hypothesized, participants who perceived the election outcome as more important 
reported greater worry about the election outcome, as did participants who felt more strongly that 
the United States would change for the worse if the opposing candidate was elected (Hypotheses 
1a-1b). 
 Risk of receiving bad news. Also as hypothesized, participants who perceived a greater 
risk that their candidate would lose worried more about the outcome of the election (Hypothesis 
2). 
 Control over the outcome. As in Study 1, participants who were more politically 
engaged worried more about the outcome of the election. Participants’ perception that their vote 
mattered was unrelated to worry (Hypotheses 3a-3b). 
 Individual differences. As hypothesized, participants lower in dispositional optimism 
and higher in defensive pessimism and intolerance of uncertainty reported greater worry 
(Hypotheses 4a-4c).  
Proximity to news. We examined changes in worry leading up to the presidential 
election using multiple regression analyses predicting worry from time (centered), candidate 
preference (Trump = -0.5, Clinton = 0.5), and their interaction. Time was coded as weeks until 
Election Day, such that the time variable decreases as Election Day neared. As hypothesized 
(Hypothesis 5), worry increased as Election Day neared, β = -.10 [95% CI: -.18, -.03], p = .008; 
neither candidate preference, β = .007 [-.07, .08], p = .86, nor the interaction, β = .009 [-.07, .09], 
p = .80, was significant. 
 Extending the uncertainty navigation model. 
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 Social context. The percentage of participants’ social group that supported their preferred 
candidate was unrelated to worry.8 However, analyses revealed a weak interaction between 
social context and candidate preference, such that the relationship was significant (and negative) 
for Clinton supporters (β = -.12 [-.16, -.01], p = .03), but not Trump supporters (β = .07 [-.02, 
.11], p = .20). That is, Clinton supporters whose social group was comprised of fewer Clinton 
supporters reported greater worry before the election. 
Media exposure. We examined both the total number of news sources participants 
reported accessing, as well as the average political leaning of the news sources they accessed. 
Findings suggest that participants who used a larger number of news sources and who accessed 
more conservative news sources on average were more worried (albeit only somewhat more, in 
the case of the political leaning of news sources) about the election outcome. However, political 
leaning of news sources was no longer a significant predictor of worry when controlling for 
participants’ political orientation rather than candidate preference (all other results remain 
consistent when controlling for political orientation).   
 All together now. Lastly, we conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting worry 
from all predictors of interest, controlling for candidate preference, to identify the strongest 
independent relationships with worry.9 Results from this analysis appear in Table 6. In order of 
the magnitude of each effect, findings suggest that participants who were higher in intolerance of 
uncertainty, perceived the election to be more important, expected the United States to change 
for the worse if their candidate lost, were surrounded by fewer people who supported their 
                                                          
8 These findings were consistent when examining the relationship between each individual social group (friends, 
family, coworkers, and acquaintances) and worry.  
9 No two predictor variables were correlated greater than r = .43, thus providing reassurance against 
multicollinearity concerns. We also once again inspected residual plots, finding no cause for concern, and results 
were nearly identical when correcting for potential heteroscedasticity.  
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preferred candidate, and were more politically engaged experienced significantly greater worry. 
Additionally, participants who perceived a greater risk of losing the election and were lower in 
dispositional optimism experienced somewhat greater worry, although those relationships fell 
short of traditional standards for statistical significance in the full regression model. The 
standardized estimates for all of the predictors except dispositional optimism and total news 
sources fell within the 95% confidence intervals of the standardized estimates within the 
individual regression models. 
General Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine predictors of worry in anticipation of the outcome 
of political elections using the uncertainty navigation model (as well as an extended framework 
for understanding the model’s predictions) as a guide. Taken together, our findings 
predominantly supported our hypotheses and thus the predictions of the model. Specifically, 
voters tended to worry more about the election outcome when it was closer to Election Day and 
when they felt the election would be more consequential, as did voters who were more politically 
engaged, had a set of worry-exacerbating traits, and were surrounded by supporters of the 
opposing candidate. Study 2 also found that voters were more likely to worry when they felt that 
losing the election was more likely. These findings generally held when entering all predictors 
into a simultaneous regression model, suggesting that they have independent relationships with 
worry—although in both studies, intolerance of uncertainty, perceived importance of the election 
outcome, and political engagement were clearly the strongest predictors.   
Although our studies provide a strong initial test of the uncertainty navigation model in a 
political context across two elections and with a theoretically-grounded set of predictors 
predictor, we propose four avenues for future research to extend our inquiry. First, future 
research can replicate and extend our findings regarding political engagement to better 
DIVIDED WE STAND  22 
 
understand the dynamics of perceived control in the context of stressful waiting periods. The 
only finding to contradict the predictions of the uncertainty navigation model was the positive 
relationship between political engagement and worry, which suggests that becoming actively 
involved in steering the outcome of the election failed to reassure these engaged voters. Of 
course, this finding is consistent with the study mentioned earlier that examined worry in the 
context of issues relevant to the European Union (Strohmeier et al., 2017). The authors of that 
study posited that worry leads to engagement, rather than the other way around—a plausible 
explanation for our finding as well.  
Another possibility is that investment in the election outcome generated both worry and 
engagement. In fact, participants’ perceptions of the importance of the election outcome was 
robustly associated at a bivariate level with both worry and engagement in both studies. Follow-
up analyses (see footnote10) were consistent with the possibility that importance was driving the 
relationship between engagement and worry in Study 2, but not Study 1. Clearly further research 
is needed to better understand the emotional dynamics of engagement in political elections.   
We note that the original description of the uncertainty navigation model focused more 
on “treatability” of an undesirable outcome rather than control over one’s immediate fate 
(Sweeny & Cavanaugh, 2012). That is, the model proposed that people would worry less about 
an outcome that was mutable (e.g., a treatable illness) than one that was permanent (e.g., a 
terminal illness). The current study suggests that control over one’s outcome may be more 
complex in its relationship with worry, such that worry may prompt people to take action to 
                                                          
10 In Study 1, a regression analysis predicting worry from perceived importance (β = .20, p < .001) and political 
engagement (β = .33, p < .001) suggests that both variables are independent predictors of worry. In Study 2, the 
same regression analysis revealed that only perceived importance (β = .29, p < .001) and not engagement (β = -.002, 
p = .96) independently predicted worry. 
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ensure a desirable outcome, but those actions seem to provide little comfort as uncertainty 
persists.  
Second, because we focused on theoretically-proposed predictors, we did not address 
circumstances that were particularly relevant to the context of our studies, namely the ever-
shifting socio-political climate leading up to the elections. Although we may have captured some 
influence of the political climate through our assessment of media exposure, we did not include 
direct assessments of polling fluctuations, sensational press reports, or other election-relevant 
events. Future research should examine the extent to which people are informed about the 
political climate and how changes in this climate might influence worry about election outcomes. 
Third, we tested our theoretical predictions in a non-clinical sample rather than target a 
population that particularly struggles with worry, and in which worry has been studied most 
extensively—namely, people with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Excessive and persistent 
worry is a hallmark of GAD (National Institute of Mental Health, 2016). One model of worry in 
the context of GAD, the contrast avoidance model (Newman et al., 2013), posits that GAD 
sufferers find downward shifts in emotional states (e.g., from positive to neutral or neutral to 
negative) to be aversive, and thus they embrace worry as a means by which to avoid such shifts. 
For example, a pro-Clinton voter who suffers from GAD might have feared the possibility of 
shattering disappointment on the night of the 2016 presidential election. To avoid the crush of 
unexpected bad news, this hypothetical voter would likely have worried heartily about the 
election outcome in the weeks or months before Election Day, thus reducing the likelihood that 
bad news would come as an emotional shock.  
Although most people prefer to avoid unpleasant surprises and will adopt a pessimistic 
mindset in an effort to avoid them (e.g., Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006), the intensity of 
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these psychological machinations is turned up in those who suffer from GAD. We did not 
include a diagnostic assessment of GAD symptoms in our studies, and thus we do not know the 
extent to which our results reflect normative or disordered worry and its correlates. Further 
research should recruit participants who suffer from GAD to determine whether worrisome 
situations like the uncertainty preceding a political election affect them in similar or distinct 
ways compared to non-clinical samples.         
Further pointing to the importance of studying clinical populations in future studies is the 
prominent role of intolerance of uncertainty in our findings. Intolerance of uncertainty as a trait-
like individual difference emerged in studies of people with GAD, and as a particular focus of 
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (Dugas et al., 1998), and people who are high in 
intolerance of uncertainty tend to report the type and magnitude of daily worries that are 
associated with GAD (e.g., Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013; Buhr & 
Dugas, 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, participants in our studies with this dispositional 
tendency were also at particularly high risk for pre-election worry. This finding suggests that 
people with GAD would likely report elevated worry prior to important elections, but studies 
targeting this population are necessary to confirm this prediction.     
As a final area for future inquiry, the uncertainty navigation model posits that worry is a 
response to aversive uncertainty and heightened when a person lacks the ability to control the 
future. However, given the correlational and cross-sectional nature of our data cannot provide 
evidence for causality. For example, people who felt that their candidate was likely to lose the 
election may have experienced worry about this outcome, and that worry may have in turn fed 
their pessimism. Future studies can get one step closer to directionality via longitudinal designs 
that allow for cross lag analyses to narrow temporal order of the predictors examined and worry. 
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Ultimately, experimental studies would be best for determining causality and future research 
should attempt to simulate the social uncertainty experienced in a political context.  
It’s Not Personal, It’s Politics  
Beyond the specific goals of our study, the findings provide corroborating evidence for 
the usefulness of the uncertainty navigation model, in a context quite different from the one in 
which it was developed. Waiting in this context likely differed in numerous ways from the types 
of waiting periods that are typically the topic of study in this research area, most notably the 
extent to which the outcome has clear, immediate, and significant personal consequences (or lack 
thereof). Considering the slow progression of policy development and implementation, many of 
the election’s consequences will only reveal themselves over months, years, or even decades 
after Election Day—and until they do, it is difficult to know exactly which people will be 
affected and how those effects will transpire. Nonetheless, the predictors of worry laid out in the 
uncertainty navigation model seem to be a good fit when awaiting both concrete, personal 
outcomes (e.g., results of a medical test, outcome on the bar exam) and more abstract, societal 
outcomes. 
Using a novel context to study waiting experiences also allowed us to examine several 
context-specific and exploratory predictors of worry. First, we considered the social context of 
our participants, specifically the extent to which their family, friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances were on their “team” when it came to their preferred presidential candidate. This 
analysis was exploratory, and one could imagine the relationship between social context and 
worry going one of two ways. Perhaps being surrounded by similarly-minded loved ones and 
coworkers serves to heighten worry via a type of group polarization process, in which each 
person’s worries build on each other’s by making uncertainty more salient. In contrast, perhaps 
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being surrounded by similarly-minded loved ones and coworkers provides a cocoon of mutual 
reassurance and optimism. Our findings suggest that the latter process was more dominant in 
anticipation of the 2016 presidential election. In the final regression analysis, voters in a more 
politically homogeneous social context were less worried overall—although our more targeted 
analysis suggested that this effect was only apparent among Clinton supporters.  
Second, we considered voters’ individual media landscapes, including the number of 
individual news sources participants accessed and the political leaning of those news sources. 
Although initial analyses suggested that people who accessed more news sources worried more, 
this effect disappeared when we controlled for all predictors in a single regression model. 
Similarly, initial analyses suggested that voters who viewed more conservative news might have 
worried more, even controlling for the candidate they preferred; however, this effect disappeared 
when controlling for political orientation instead (strongly related to candidate preference, but 
not perfectly equivalent) and in the multiple regression analysis. As a whole, these findings 
suggest that media exposure was not a strong nor consistent predictor of worry in the context of 
the presidential election.  
At a broader level, our study points to opportunities to extend the uncertainty navigation 
model to new populations and new experiences with uncertainty. Together with previous studies 
that provide support for many of the model’s predictions (e.g., Howell & Sweeny, 2016; Sweeny 
& Andrews, 2014; Sweeny et al., 2015, 2016), our findings point to the generalizability of the 
model and specifically the model’s proposed predictors of worry. As in our study, future work 
across varying domains of uncertainty can pair the model’s predictors with context-specific 
predictors to more thoroughly understand the dynamics of worry during stressful waiting 
periods. 
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